**China’s Submission on “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition” Round Table**

**1. Mandate**

In accordance with the Decision 1/CP.25 of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as the "Convention"), a round table on “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition” will be held during COP26 to take stock of global action and efforts on climate change, and challenges faced by Parties in relation to action and support in the pre-2020 period. According to this decision, Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to submit inputs by the end of September 2020 to inform the round table. China welcomes the opportunity of this submission and would like to submit the following information.

**2. Preliminary Evaluation of “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition”**

To achieve the objectives of the Convention, the international community should, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, take comprehensive and ambitious actions to address climate change and effectively implement their commitments. China recognizes that the active engagements and positive progress in mitigation, adaptation, as well as provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support to developing countries. Parties included in the Annex I and Annex II of the Convention have made quantified emission reduction and climate finance support commitments under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol according to respective provisions, and have made efforts to fulfill their commitments, but there is still significant gap between the progress and the commitments.

The year of 2020 is crucial for the multilateral process on climate change, all Parties will communicate or update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the decisions of CMA. Ambitious commitments are of great importance to the achievement of the goals of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, and the implementation and delivery of commitments are even more important. A comprehensive evaluation and stock-take of the “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition” and recognizing the gap between commitments and progresses will help Parties to have clarity on the real-world starting-point of the implementation of NDC, experiences and lessons learnt from pre-2020 period, and build mutual trust for post-2020 climate action. This is of great forward-looking significance for the full and effective implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement in post-2020, and for the positive and responsible formulation and implementation of the NDC and long-term low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission development strategies.

**2.1 Progress of Developed Countries’ Mitigation Commitments by 2020**

Under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, developed countries have the obligation to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions. According to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report, in order to achieve the goal of keeping the temperature rise below 2°C by the end of the 21st century, developed countries should reduce their emissions by 25%-40% by 2020 from 1990 levels. Developed countries will need to achieve even greater emissions reductions by 2020 if they are to achieve the 1.5°C target. Under the Cancun Agreement, developed country Parties made individual commitment to reduce emissions by 2020, the aggregation of which is equivalent to about 10% of 1990 GHG emissions. There has been a big gap towards the conclusion of the IPCC. The progress is only about 25% to 40% of what is requested by science, and did not reflect the share of responsibilities and ambitions of developed country Parties which should take lead in emission reduction.

According to the 2018 National Inventory Report submitted by developed countries in 2020, some developed countries have already achieved their 2020 emission reduction commitments, but overall the developed countries are insufficient in implementing their pre-2020 commitments. The main findings are as follows: First, the progresses on mitigation in some developed countries are extremely slow. In 2018, the progress of some developed countries is even less than 50% towards its 2020 target commitments, and the GHG emissions are still high. Second, the GHG emissions of some developed countries in 2018 has not reduced but increased compared with 1990 levels, and the trend of GHG emissions has also continued rising. It is not only difficult for these countries to meet its 2020 emission reduction targets, but also fail to demonstrate that its emission trend is expected to be significantly changed, so as to achieve the NDC in 2030. Third, some developed countries have achieved their 2020 emission reduction targets as early as in 2015 or even earlier, while it did not increase its ambition of 2020 emission reduction targets, meaning that developed countries did not comply with the Convention which requires the developed countries taking the lead in reducing emissions. In addition, the accounting methodology for GHG emission target of some developed countries remains unclear, e.g. the relationship between the single-year target of 2020 and its emissions budget targets for the period 2013-2020, whether the emissions or sinks of LULUCF sectors are included in the base year and/or the target year as well as relevant accounting methodologies, etc.

**2.2 Requirements and Progress of Adaptation Actions by 2020**

The objective of the Convention is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” At the same time, Article 4.7 of the Convention states that the implementation of the Convention by developing country Parties should “take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.” The Convention emphasizes the importance of adaptation, food security and poverty eradication in the implementations of the Convention by developing countries. Many developing countries have pointed out in their National Communications that poverty reduction and adaptation improvement are one and the same. At the same time, the provision of supports by developed countries in accordance with their existing commitments is an important manifestation of their responsibilities and obligations.

Developing countries are suffering from increasingly severe adverse impacts caused by climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further increased their vulnerability. For a long time, the developing countries, through the National Communications, NDCs, Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) etc., repeatedly reported the needs to adapt to climate change in areas such as insufficient supply of clean drinking water, agriculture plant diseases and insect pests, biological invasion, forest fires, deforestation, forest diseases and pests, insufficient meteorological observation facilities, floods, drought, coastal erosion, seawater intrusion caused by sea level rise, malaria and other insect-borne diseases, the waste of food caused by improper storage, which reflects the fact that developed countries have not yet provided necessary, timely and adequate support to developing countries with regard to the adaptation to climate change. Twenty developing countries have developed National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) with the support of the GEF, but the GEF has not yet established a mechanism to support developing countries in implementing their NAPs. Current support falls far short of meeting the basic needs of developing countries to adapt to climate change. Therefore, the scale, comprehensiveness, sustainability and long-lasting of adaptation support from developed countries to developing countries needs to be enhanced. According to the World Bank, the cost of adaptation to climate change in developing countries is estimated at USD 75 billion to USD 100 billion per year between 2010 and 2050. According to UNEP's assessment, the cost of adaptation in developing countries will rise further due to the slow progress of the implementation by developed countries by pre-2020, possibly rising to USD 140 billion to USD 300 billion per year by 2030 and USD 280 billion to USD 500 billion per year by 2050, if new and additional adaptation support is not secured, the gap will continue to widen drastically in the following decades.

In contrast to the support provided for mitigation, the support provided by developed countries for adaptation in developing countries is grossly inadequate and extremely unbalanced, and the situation is getting worse. During the pre-2020 period, regarding the developed countries’ adaptation support to developing countries, there have been long-standing problems such as low proportion of support funds, non-transparent finance flow, insufficient support for adaptation related technology transfer and capacity building, which demonstrates that developed countries failed to comply its committed responsibilities and obligations. In terms of finance, as assessed by the Standing Committee on Finance, from 2015 to 2016, only 29% of the support provided by developed countries to developing countries through bilateral channels is used for adaptation actions, and only 25% of multilateral funds were used for adaptation, which was significantly lower than that of mitigation. Developed countries have made some efforts to provide adaptation related technology transfer and capacity-building for developing countries, but there is still a big gap between the adaptation needs of developing countries and the support provided.

Global adaptation to climate change is progressing slowly in the pre-2020 period, and developing countries are facing greater challenges in adapting to climate change. The main obstacles are as follows: First, process under the Convention has the phenomenon of emphasizing mitigation and neglecting adaptation in reality, and the international community generally does not pay enough attention to adapting to climate change. Second, there has been a lack of clear global goals and effective mechanisms for climate change adaptation under the system of the Convention for a long time, and it is difficult to provide sustainable and comprehensive guidance and support for global and developing countries to carry out adaptation actions. Third, the existing technology transfer and capacity-building institutions and mechanisms under the Convention mostly focus on advisory and advice functions, and provide developing countries with insufficient support on adaptation related technology transfer and capacity building. Fourth, the developed countries are inadequate in implementing their mitigation commitments in the pre-2020 period, and in providing finance support, causing developing countries to face a greater funding gap for adaptation.

**2.3 The Commitment and Progress of Support Provided by Developed Countries by 2020**

The Convention stipulates that Annex II Parties shall provide new and additional finance support and transfer environmentally sound technologies to developing countries. Developed countries committed in the Cancun Agreement to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. Paragraph 114 of Decision 1/CP.21 strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete road map to achieve the goal of providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020; Paragraph 53 decides that developed countries continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025, and prior to 2025 the CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.

During the pre-2020 period, developed countries have provided some extent of public finance support through multilateral, bilateral and regional channels, and mobilized social capital to assist developing countries in combating climate change. However, there are several significant obstacles: First, there is a lack of systematic assessment on developed countries’ compliance of providing USD 100 billion per year, which has led to a lack of clarity for understanding of the overall progress by developed Parties, therefore it cannot provide effective experience and information for post-2020 finance support arrangements. Second, based on available information, there is a huge gap between the actual funding scale of developed countries’ commitments and the needs of developing countries. Except for the United States and Iceland that have not yet submitted their fourth Biennial Report thus data are not available, according to the most recent data in 2018, the “climate finance” provided to developing countries by all other Annex II Parties through multilateral, bilateral and regional channels (including the committed amount and the disbursed amount) is far from the developed countries’ commitment of providing USD 100 billion per annul. Many developing countries and NGOs have pointed out that most of the financial support provided by developed countries comes from ODA, and the vast majority of developed countries have not clarified whether these supports and existing ODA provided to developing countries in fields of environment and sustainable development are double counted, such as for biodiversity conservation, eliminate ozone-depleting substances, and combat desertification etc., which cannot reflect effective compliance of developed countries’ obligation under the Convention that Annex II Parties shall provide finance support to developing countries and the climate finance shall be new and additional.

According to GEF, its seventh replenishment totaled USD 4.1 billion, which decreased for the first time in history with a decrease of USD 333 million from the sixth replenishment. The climate change sector only accounts for USD 801 million, a decrease of 36.4%. The historical debts of individual developed countries are relatively large, reaching USD 319 million. According to GCF, as of March 31, 2020, the initial committed contribution of developed countries totaled USD 10.2 billion, confirmed commitments were USD 8.12 billion, disbursed amount was USD 8.09 billion, and developed countries’ unfulfilled contribution exceeded 20%. The disbursed amount of some developed countries is even below 1/3 of their committed contribution. As of July 2020, during the first replenishment period of the GCF, developed countries have committed a contribution of USD 9.8 billion, while the confirmed contribution is only USD 3.8 billion, accounting for 38.8% only.

Developing countries face serious obstacles in gaining access to technology transfer and capacity-building support to address climate change. The current climate-friendly technology transfer activities are mainly based on the private sector and are realized in a traditional market-based ways. However, the insufficient public engagement of developed countries' governments makes it difficult to reflect their efforts to carry out technology transfer to comply the obligations of the Convention. Developing countries have identified targeted and systematic technological needs through TNAs and formed a large number of Technological Action Plans (TAPs), but they cannot be effectively implemented due to lack of follow-up financial support. The technology mechanism under the Convention lacks sufficient, stable and sustainable funding guarantees, and it is difficult to effectively support the actual needs of climate-friendly technology transfer to developing countries. The current capacity-building activities are fragmented, failing to be consistent and systematic. Existing capacity-building support channels are unclear, insufficient in scale, and in some cases lack of transparency and fairness. It is difficult for developing countries to obtain effective capacity-building support through fair and stable multilateral channels according to their own capacity-building needs.

**3. Recommendations on the Round Table**

**3.1 The Purpose of the Round Table**

The purpose of this round table is to take stock of the global progress on the implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol by 2020, including the progress and gaps in the implementation of the emission reduction and support commitments by developed countries, and to identify experiences and lessons for the full and effective implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, offering references for the positive and responsible formulation and implementation of NDC and long-term low GHG emission development strategies.

**3.2 Organization of the Round Table**

Considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, China suggests that the round table should include online warm-up activities and formal in-person round table at COP26. The formal round table includes two parts: technical segment and high-level segment.

China suggests holding an online warm-up activity in 2020 and inviting all Parties and non-Parties stakeholders to discuss the “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition”.

Regarding the technical segment of the formal round table, China suggests including three topics: First, the progress and experience of actions during the pre-2020 period, including sharing of policies, measures and effectiveness in implementing mitigation, adaptation, and support commitments. Second, the pre-2020 implementation gap, as well as difficulties and obstacles, including sharing understanding on gaps in the implementation of mitigation, adaptation, and support commitments, as well as difficulties and obstacles encountered in the process. Third, ways to address the gap emerged during the pre-2020 period. Parties and non-Parties stakeholders shall be invited to participate in the discussion. It is recommended that two co-chairs (one from Annex I and the other from non-Annex I Parties) shall chair the discussion and summarize the main points of the discussion of the three topics with the assistance of the UNFCCC secretariat.

Regarding the high-level segment of the formal round table, China suggests including three activities in the agenda: First, the report on the technical segment. It is suggested that the co-chairs of the technical segment shall report the summary of the discussion. The second is about the discussion among Parties. The delegates of all Parties discuss the progress, gaps and solutions to the implementation of pre-2020 commitments, as well as the implication to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, NDC and the long-term low GHG emission development strategies. Third, non-Parties stakeholders are invited to express their views. It is suggested that influential persons in the multilateral process on climate change shall be invited to chair the discussion.

China suggests that both segments of the formal round table at COP26 session shall be open to the media.

**3.3 Suggested Time**

China suggests that in November and/or December 2020, in conjunction with the secretariat's online activities in the second half of 2020, the round table online warm-up activities shall be held at an appropriate time.

China suggests that the formal round table shall be held at COP26 in accordance with the Decision 1/CP.25. The schedule of the round table should avoid overlap with related activities, such as Multilateral Assessments of developed country Parties, Facilitative Sharing of Views of developing country Parties and Structured Expert Dialogues for the second periodic review etc. It is suggested that the technical segment and the high-level segment shall be held in the first and second weeks of COP26, respectively. The UNFCCC secretariat could use the time between the two segments to assist the co-chairs in summarizing the main points of discussion at the technical segment.