

# **Submission by the Republic of Gabon on behalf of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) on the COP26 roundtable on “Pre-2020 Implementation and Ambition”**

## **(I) Introduction:**

1. This note is submitted in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 of decision 1/CP.25, in which the Conference of the Parties decided to *“hold, at its twenty-sixth (2020) session, a round table among Parties and non-Party stakeholders on pre-2020 implementation and ambition”* and invited Parties and non-Party stakeholders to *“submit inputs via the submission portal by September 2020”* to inform the aforementioned roundtable.
2. Parties shall recall that the adoption the Paris Agreement in 2015 was only made possible through the clear and well-established balance between action and ambition prior to 2020, and action and ambition in the post 2020 period in which the Paris Agreement comes into force. This was clearly indicated in **section IV of decision 1/CP.21 paragraphs 105-132**.
3. As of today, there remains a significant gap in the pre-2020 implementation and ambition. Africa, being one of the most affected continents by the negative impacts of climate change, is thus one of the most impacted by this gap and by the lack of a clear commitment on part of developed countries to address it in an effective, systematic and concerted manner, in accordance with UNFCCC provisions and COP decisions, in particular on provision of means of implementation and adequate support for climate actions in developing countries.
4. Africa is under increasing pressure more than ever due to the extreme events of climate change. Flash floods and heavy rainfall in North and Western Africa is killing and displacing thousands and heavily damaging infrastructure. Extreme drought in East Africa is affecting livestock, crops, wildlife, and the energy sector. Cyclones in Southern Africa are causing the deaths of thousands and the destruction of property. Climate change in Central Africa is causing significant environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity in the Lake Chad basin. African countries affected by these extreme events are lacking climate finance supports, access to climate technologies and human and institutional capacities to effectively deal with their implications, and are already suffering from existing development challenges.
5. It is imperative that pre-2020 action be enhanced at all levels. In doing so, Parties would not be looking backwards, as claimed by some, but would rather be enhancing and complimenting intended post-2020 action under the Paris Agreement, taking into

consideration that the overall outcome of all climate action, pre or post 2020, would ultimately contribute to achieving the 1.5/2.0C goal of the Paris Agreement. An effective fulfillment of the Pre-2020 action and ambition on part of developed countries would thus constitute a solid foundation for the post-2020 action, and give a positive signal for developing countries to explore ways and means to enhance their ambition under the Paris Agreement. In looking forward to get prepared for Paris Agreement implementation, Parties must keep in mind and continue efforts as committed under the UNFCCC. Paris agreement is just an additional instrument to enhance UNFCCC implementation.

6. The AGN has previously submitted notes in preparation for the stock-takes held at COP24 and COP25, and African Countries have actively engaged in those two events. The AGN acknowledges that these events helped to highlight and enhance the understanding of efforts and challenges faced by Parties in relation to action and support in the pre-2020 period, as well as of the work of the UNFCCC bodies in relation to that period. The round table, which will be convened at COP26, is also a welcomed step to that effect.
7. Nevertheless, the African Group views COP26 as an opportunity for assessing if adequate financial, technological and capacity building supports have been provided from developed countries for developing countries in accordance with UNFCCC provisions and COP decisions and taking more serious collective action towards addressing the pre-2020 gap(s), now that its (their) existence has been established. The round table at COP26 should then be focused on practical and meaningful steps under the Convention to address gap(s), rather than sharing reflections and re-stating principals.
8. In the following sections, this note will identify a number of key issues that Africa deems of relevance to an objective and outcome-oriented discussion at the COP26 round table, and will put forward proposed recommendations for the summary report that will be prepared by the secretariat in that regard, pursuant to paragraph 21 of decision 1/CP.25.

## (II) Addressing the Pre-2020 Mitigation Gap:

9. The most recently published scientific data, including in **UNEP's Emissions Gap report**, is reason enough for Africa to be hugely concerned. Greenhouse gas emissions have risen 1.5 per cent a year over the last decade. At current trends, holding temperature increase at 1.5/2.0C is becoming increasingly impossible, and global warming of between 3.4 and 3.9 degrees Celsius by the end of the century is becoming more likely.
10. Africa stresses on the urgent need to address the **significant gap** between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation efforts in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020, and the aggregate emission pathways consistent with holding the increase

in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.

11. A crucially significant component of the pre-2020 mitigation gap is the delayed entry into force of the **Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol**. Under the terms of the Protocol, ratification of amendments by at least three-fourths of its Parties is required in order for them to enter into force. As of January 2020, 136 out of the 192 Parties to the Protocol have ratified the Doha Amendment, with eight ratifications outstanding for its entry into force.
12. Moreover, a number of developed country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have decided **not to sign nor ratify** the Doha Amendment. Even more alarming, the developed country Party historically responsible for the largest amount of emissions **never became a Party** to the Kyoto Protocol, increasing the mitigation GHG emissions gap.
13. This delay of entry into force is a missed opportunity that cost the world significant emission cuts that would have helped bridge the pre-2020 gap and would have contributed to the overall achievement of the Convention and the Paris Agreement goals. The Doha Amendment requires Annex I Parties to cut their GHG emissions at least by 18% relative to 1990 levels during the second commitment period (2013-2020); and to cut their GHG emissions by at least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020; and to revisit their 2020 targets no later than 2014. However, Annex I Parties have not accomplished these commitments. No Annex I developed country revisited their 2020 targets up to now. EU committed in their NDC to reduce GHG emissions by 40% by 2030 on the level of 1990, i.e. resulting in a 10-year lag in implementation compared to what it should be achieving by 2020 pursuant to paragraph 7, decision 1/CMP.8. Canada committed to reduce GHG emissions by 30% by 2030 on the level of 2005, resulting in a 10-year lag in implementation relative to 2020, and constitutes a 25-year delay relative to the baseline year. Although the US has already officially started the withdrawal process from the Paris Agreement, its Nationally Determined Contribution thereunder as communicated during the Obama Administration in 2016 was to reduce GHG emissions by 36-28% below 2005 levels by 2025, a target that constitutes a 5-year delay relative to 2020, and a 20-year delay relative to the baseline year, and a mitigation gap that will need to be recovered against any climate ambitious target.
14. To that effect, the African Group is of the view that:
  - (a) Parties that have not yet ratified the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol should **do that as soon as possible** to allow the Amendment's entry into force.

- (b) Developed Countries should **enhance the ambition** of their 2020 quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets as communicated by them and contained in document FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1.
- (c) Annex I Parties should also **continue to meet their reporting obligations under the Convention**. The failure of some Parties to submit their seventh National Communications and their third Biennial Reports is a cause for concern for the African Group
- (d) Annex I Parties should **enhance ambition of the mitigation component** of their NDCs to reduce their GHG emissions by 2025, or at latest 2030, by the extent necessary to fill the pre-2020 gaps, as well as report the progress achieved in filling these pre2020 gaps as part of their biennial transparency reports when tracking progress towards achieving their NDCs.

### (III) Addressing the pre-2020 Adaptation Gap

15. Another very important component of the pre-2020 implementation and ambition gap is the one regarding **adaptation efforts**. Recent reports, including the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C and the 2018 UNEP Adaptation Gap report, indicate that **both urgent and transformational adaptation action is needed to reduce climate-related risk**. These reports also estimate that the true costs of adaptation in developing countries **could be up to \$300bn per year by 2031**, and that there are substantial benefits to be gained from acting now. Yet, adaptation action is not keeping pace with the scale of impacts, and the international institutional setup on adaptation under the Convention has proved to be insufficient to meet the increasing adaptation demands of the African continent.
16. The **Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A)** conducted by the Adaptation Committee in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, concluded in its key messages that financial and capacity support for adaptation is **crucial**, and that **new and additional** funds are needed from public and private sources. The **Adaptation Fund** in its submission on the 2019 Pre-2020 Stock take also indicated that the record number of project and programme proposals received by the Fund Board from vulnerable developing countries in the period 2015–2019, is clearly showing that the demand for the Fund’s resources is rapidly increasing in a manner that **exceeds its available resources**.
17. In order to meet their adaptation demands, African countries are already taking actions, drawing up national adaptation plans and strategies and **contributing some 20 per cent of the annual cost of adaptation from their own budgets**, according to UNEP’s reports.

This is putting financial burdens on African countries and shifting valuable resources from other sustainable development and poverty eradication priorities.

**18.** It is clear that to address the pre-2020 adaptation gap; more action needs to be taken, in particular on part of developed countries. This includes:

- (a) Enhancing public finance for adaptation at all levels, including through **new and additional innovative resources**. One proposal supported by the African Group is to direct **a share of the proceeds** from the new market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement (articles 6.2 and 6.4) to adaptation purposes, primarily to the adaptation fund, now serving the Paris Agreement.
- (b) Strengthening the adaptation institutional setup under the UNFCCC, including through **enhancing financing** to constituted bodies and mechanisms dealing with **adaptation** and **addressing loss and damage**, including the Adaptation Committee, the Adaptation Fund and the Warsaw international mechanism on loss and damage.
- (c) Scaling up support for African owned institutions working on adaptation, such as the **Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI)**.
- (d) A forward-looking approach, which would also contribute to bridging the pre-2020 adaptation gap, is the effective operationalization of article 7 of the Paris Agreement on the **global goal for adaptation**, through the agreement on a dedicated framework aiming at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change.

#### **(IV) Addressing the pre-2020 finance gap:**

**19.** Annex II developed country Parties have committed under Article 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 of the Convention to provide scaled-up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding to developing countries to support their implementation of the Convention. This commitment was quantified by paragraph 98, decision 1/CP.16, in which developed countries committed to a **goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020** to address the needs of developing countries.

**20.** However, according to the Standing Committee on Finance's Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows published in 2014, 2016, and 2018, the total climate finance flows mobilized by developed countries reported through their biennial reports were USD 28.755 billion in 2011, USD 28.863 billion in 2012, USD 25.4 billion in 2013, USD 26.6 billion in 2014, USD 33 billion in 2015, and USD 38 billion in 2016.

21. Africa is one of the continents most in need of climate finance. African national budgets have been increasingly **strained** to meet the growing needs of climate adaptation in years pre-2020. This has affected the availability of resources for other sectors, hindering national efforts to eliminate hunger, eradicate poverty, improve health, and provide education, in the context of achieving sustainable development.
22. Post 2020, and to fulfill African actions under the Paris Agreement, these expenses will exponentially increase. The **current estimate of the finance gap for implementing the full scope of African nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement is USD 3 trillion**. Furthermore, adequate support is needed for Africa's sustainable development path including through the consideration of policies and support to allow for sustainable use of **African stranded assets**.
23. It is evidently clear that the current levels of ambition in climate finance is **not enough** to meet the USD 100 billion goal per year nor to bridge the pre-2020 finance gap, let alone to set a **new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year before 2025**, as required by paragraph 54 of decision 1/CP.21.
24. To contribute to addressing this gap, the African Group is of the view that the followings are some of the measures that need to be taken:
- (a) Developed countries should scale up their efforts to meet the USD 100 billion per year pledge, and **provide a concrete quantified plan on how finance will be mobilized and provided to achieve this goal** in an adequate, sustainable, and predictable manner.
  - (b) Pledges to the first formal replenishment of the GCF, while welcomed, amounted to **only USD 9.66 billion**, which does not even match the initial resource mobilization target of 2015. Developed countries that have already made pledges should scale up them up, and those who have not pledged need to do so as soon as possible. Developed countries should also confirm their pledges in the form of **fully executed contribution agreements or arrangements as soon as possible**. Developed countries that are accusing shortfalls must honor and provided what they pledges to the GCF.
  - (c) Developed countries need to also institutionally support the GCF, including through enabling the Fund to enjoy such **privileges and immunities** that are necessary for the fulfillment of its purpose, in accordance with paragraph 7 of its governing instrument. Such privileges and immunities will enable the fund to be more flexible in its project approval process and legal agreements, facilitating quicker access to GCF resources and faster implementation of projects after Board approval.

(d) In addition to the GCF, developed countries should also scale up their contributions to the **GEF (Climate focal area and climate countries allocations)**, as the other operating entity of the financial mechanism under the Convention, as well as to the **adaptation fund**, the **least developed countries fund**, and the **special climate change fund**, taking into consideration their value in addressing climate challenges in the African context.

**(V) Addressing the pre-2020 gaps in technology transfer and capacity building:**

- 25.** Technology transfer and capacity building are two of the most overlooked aspects of climate action, and together they constitute an important part of the pre-2020 implementation gap.
- 26.** Developed countries should continue to support the **technology mechanism** under the Convention to enable it to fulfill its mandate, including by provision of adequate and predictable finance. The Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2019 indicates that **more predictable and flexible finance would help to ensure the sustainability of the CTCN** and enable it to leverage the resources required to deliver on its mandate and support the implementation of the technology framework under the Paris Agreement.
- 27.** Developed countries should also, in efforts to address the pre-2020 technology gap, take deliberate actions to ensure the **availing and dissemination** of climate friendly technologies. Fields such as agriculture and smart irrigation, renewables, electric mobility, pharmaceuticals and early warning systems are some of the areas that would benefit from enhanced action on technology transfer, including through bilateral cooperation with African countries.
- 28.** On capacity building, the **Paris Committee for Capacity Building (PCCB)**, in its 2019 annual technical progress report to COP25, noted that despite overall progress in capacity-building related to climate action at the national level in developing countries, there are still institutional, technical and financial capacity gaps and needs with respect to the implementation of the **adaptation** and **mitigation** components of their NDCs. The report also highlighted that there are significant differences among countries in terms of the scope and scale of those gaps and needs.
- 29.** It is recommended that more support be availed to developing countries in undertaking the **assessment of their capacity gaps and needs** with regard to the full implementation of their current NDCs and the development of new or updated NDCs by 2020. Through this forward-looking approach, pre-2020 capacity gaps could be bridged, enabling these countries to enhance their post-2020 climate action as stipulated in their NDCs.

(VI) **Conclusion and recommendations for the summary report:**

30. To conclude, the African Group wishes to emphasize that **enhanced post-2020 ambition and action are integrally linked to enhanced pre-2020 ambition and actions**. Increased ambition and effective action by developed countries to address their pre-2020 implementation gaps with respect to their mitigation targets, and to the provision of adaptation support, and provision of finance and technology to developing countries, will enable increased mitigation and adaptation actions by developing countries, thus strengthening and enhancing the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
31. Enhanced pre-2020 action and support in terms of finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building from developed countries to developing countries, provides a **solid foundation** for post-2020 implementation. It is also important to ensure that developing countries are not overly burdened by the transfer of this gap to the post-2020 era.
32. The summary report that will be prepared by the secretariat following the roundtable at COP26, pursuant to paragraph 21 of decision 1/CP.25, **should capture the outcomes of the discussions therein** and provide an **overall assessment of the pre-2020 implementation and ambition gap**, based on the 2018 and 2019 stock takes and on submissions by parties. The report should also include the **actionable recommendations** proposed by Parties in their submissions and as voiced during the roundtable.
33. The following are proposed **actionable recommendations** that the African Group would like to put forward during the roundtable discussion, and which it believes should be included in the secretariat's report. This is without prejudice other Parties' views and submissions:
- (a) A **two-year work programme under the SBI on Pre-2020 implementation and ambition** should be established, with the aim of formally **identifying the progress and gaps** on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, in the pre-2020 commitments by developed countries, and to **make arrangement to bridge these gaps**. The work programme should include an open call for submissions, and annual workshops to review progress and to prepare recommendations for the COP to review and take **appropriate action**.
  - (b) Developed countries should include, in their NDCs under the Paris Agreement, **additional** goals, targets, and measures **specifically designated** to address the pre-2020 gap in all its aspects. These pre-2020 climate actions should be **over and above** other climate action intended towards the achievement of the Paris

Agreement goals, given the fact that both pre and post 2020 climate action are inextricably linked and have the ultimate goal of holding the average global temperature increase at 1.5C.

- (c) Consequently, developed countries should also report on the **fulfillment** of these efforts to bridge the pre-2020 implementation and ambition gap, as part of their **biennial transparency reports** when tracking progress towards the implementation of their NDCs, **under specifically designated pre-2020 headers**. This would ensure transparency, accuracy, completeness, consistency, and comparability, while avoiding double counting and upholding environmental integrity.
- (d) Towards fulfilling the USD 100 billion pledge, developed countries should provide a **concrete quantified plan on how finance will be mobilized and made accessible for developing countries to achieve this goal** in an adequate, sustainable, and predictable manner. Such plan should outline **finance targets according to a conceivable time frame**. It should be comprehensive, robust, and include provisions to avoid double counting. It should also lay a path towards the intended agreement on a **new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year before 2025**, as required by paragraph 54 of decision 1/CP.21
- (e) In addition, developed countries should also be supporting all **extra efforts towards addressing climate change**, whether on the national, regional, or global levels, through the various **multi-stakeholders initiatives** and work plans on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and other areas of concern, taking into account the **complementarity** of these efforts with efforts under the UNFCCC process, while ensuring that these additional efforts are over and above their NDCs. Developed countries must ensure that adaptation measures and other measures don't have adverse effects and consequences on developing countries.